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Germany exhibits a strong reduction in domestic manufacturing production depth (bazaar 
effect). I argue that this reflects an unbundling of comparative advantage. Using a model 
where Ricardian plus Heckscher-Ohlin-type comparative advantage relates to fragments of 
production, I compare a trading equilibrium where all fragments are located within a country 
with an equilibrium where input sub-bundles may be traded (offshoring). The model allows 
for several goods and two fragments, produced with high-skilled and low-skilled labor. I 
address wage and welfare effects under flexible wages, and under a minimum wage. I also 
explore trade policy implications and compare offshoring to migration. 
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The German economy has recently exhibited strong export performance. However, two
things have been pointed out that militate against a positive overall picture. The ￿rst is
that the export boom has for a long time failed to feed into an improvement in domestic
growth and higher employment, leading some observers to call it a ￿pathological￿phe-
nomenon. Only recently has German economic growth fallen somewhat more in line with
its strong export performance. The second is that exports of German ￿rms are based
on ever thinner shares of German value added, with ever larger shares taking place in
other countries. This latter feature has sometimes been cartooned as a trend towards
a ￿bazaar economy￿ , with a reduction in domestic production depth being dubbed a
￿bazaar-e⁄ect￿ .1
The debate in Germany and elsewhere features two opposing views. One holds that
the bazaar-e⁄ect re￿ ects gainful structural adjustment to new global conditions, featuring
new forms of international specialization and enhanced gains from trade, albeit with
potentially large pains of adjustment in the form of a sharper earnings inequality between
capital owners and di⁄erent types of workers. The other view holds that the bazaar-e⁄ect
re￿ ects a detrimental loss of international competitiveness, caused by high and rigid wages
as well as costly goods and labor market regulation.
Although such rigidity and regulation are no doubt characteristic of the German econ-
omy, they are unlikely to be the driving force behind bazaar-type phenomena. These are
similarly observed in much more ￿ exible economies, particularly the US. The bazaar-e⁄ect
thus re￿ ects a more general trend in international trade. Indeed, there is a whole strand
of literature dealing with bazaar-type phenomena, which have variously been named out-
sourcing, o⁄shoring, or fragmentation. The new element of trade stressed by this literature
is the break-up of production processes and the possibility to locate certain parts or stages
of production to other countries where cost conditions are more advantageous. The liter-
ature broadly falls into two lines of research. One focuses on wages and employment in
countries where such phenomena arise. The other focuses on contractual imperfections
relating to the (cross-border) fragmentation of industrial production, or provision of ser-
1The terms ￿bazaar economy￿and ￿pathological export boom￿have been coined by Sinn (2005a and
2005b), who also documents the empirical side of the debate.
1vices, that may explain why such fragmentation arises, and why it may arise in di⁄erent
organizational forms.2 This paper contributes to the ￿rst line of research in focusing on
wage and employment implications of bazaar-type phenomena.3
The empirical literature conveys a relatively robust message: In high-income industrial
countries, o⁄shoring has had a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on domestic wages of low-skilled
labor, although the e⁄ect is relatively small in magnitude, leaving much room for other
determinants of the wage trends observed. The intuition o⁄ered for this ￿nding is that
o⁄shoring mainly involves relocation of (low-skill) labor-intensive parts of production to
low-wage countries.4 This intuition also shapes much of the policy discussion. Yet, it is
questionable theoretically. If ￿rms move to low-wage countries for part of their production,
they should experience a cost-saving e⁄ect. This may lead them to expand other parts of
their production process that also use such labor, but for some reason cannot be relocated.
In the short run, however, if factors cannot easily be reallocated across sectors, this cost-
saving e⁄ect is very unlikely to compensate for the direct labor demand e⁄ect. Hence,
equilibrium most likely requires a fall in the domestic wage for low-skilled labor.5
But in the long run, reallocation of factors across di⁄erent industries may change the
outcome. Intuitively, if a certain industry obtains low-skill-intensive parts of its produc-
2The ￿rst strand of the literature dates back to Jones & Kierzkowski (1990), more recent contributions
are surveyed in Kohler (2003). Key kontributions to the second strand are Antr￿s & Helpman (2004,2006)
and Grossman & Helpman (2005). A very useful survey highlighting the above distinction is found in
Helpman (2006).
3Following recent literature, I de￿ne outsourcing as a switch from ￿in-house-operation￿of a sub-bundle
of inputs to subcontracting it to an independent supplier. It thus relates to the organizational form of
production. O⁄shoring relates to whether a sub-bundle draws on domestic or foreign factor markets,
irrespective of the organizational mode. Fragmentation is a somewhat more general term relating to the
separation of input-sub-bundles, without specifying what is ￿onshore￿ or ￿o⁄shore￿ . I use the terms
fragmentation and unbundling interchangeably, although unbundling proves more useful in highlighting
the notion of ￿bundling protection￿ ; see below. Whether or not any of these phenomena gives rise to a
bazaar-e⁄ect is yet another question, depending on whether we look at a single ￿rm of industry, or at the
economy at large.
4Feenstra & Hanson (2004) survey industry level evidence for the US. Other evidence, including plant-
level and micro-data-evidence is surveyed in G￿rg & Hanley (2005).
5This reasoning is substantiated in Kohler (2001,2004a), where I have analyzed the short-run e⁄ects
using a Ricardo-Viner model.
2tion at lower cost from o⁄shore, then, with a constant price of its good, this mandates
higher income paid to factors employed in other parts of its production. This follows from
the zero-pro￿t condition of a long-run equilibrium. But these other parts may well be
relatively intensive in low-skilled labor compared to other industries where o⁄shoring is
no option, or indeed to the economy at large. Then, if factors are mobile across sectors,
Stolper-Samuelson logic implies that low-skilled labor gains.6
In this paper, I propose to frame this line of reasoning in terms of unbundling compara-
tive advantage. A surprisingly large part of the literature on o⁄shoring makes no explicit,
or very little reference to comparative advantage. I argue that additional insights may be
obtained by bringing comparative advantage more prominently into the picture. Conven-
tional theory of comparative advantage views a production process as a cost-minimizing
bundle of inputs, say high-skilled and low-skilled labor, per unit of a marketable output,
given a single set of factor prices. Ricardian theory stresses that minimum costs may dif-
fer because of di⁄erences in technologies. Heckscher-Ohlin theory stresses that they are
di⁄erent across countries if relative factor prices di⁄er, even if technologies are the same.
So called ￿modern￿theory of trade and agglomeration would add that it also depends
on pecuniary externalities, due to forward- and backward linkages that arise where there
are ￿xed costs and variety e⁄ects on the materials input side. In this case, an additional
bundling dimension is present: The productivity of any one ￿rm in a given sector depends
on the number and types of ￿rms that are bundled together in a country.7
In equilibrium, if a given production process is operated in two separate locations, or
countries, then the di⁄erence between the income earned by a unit-output factor bundle
in these two locations must re￿ ect the Ricardian productivity di⁄erence plus any produc-
tivity di⁄erence deriving from agglomeration. If the number of processes operated jointly
in the two locations is at least as large as the number of factors, then the same must
be true for each factor separately ￿the case of factor price equalization through trade.
The productivity of such input bundles across di⁄erent goods, together with the corre-
sponding factor intensities, determine what general equilibrium theory calls the country￿ s
factor price frontier. This describes alternative factor price combinations mandated by
the country￿ s technological knowledge, given goods prices on world markets.
6In Kohler (2003 and 2004a), I derive general long-run results for a Heckscher-Ohlin model.
7For a general discussion of this modern view of ￿bundling￿ , see Baldwin (2006b).
3But a typical modern industrial process is ineptly described in terms of a single,
coherent input bundle. Suppose, then, that the unit-output-bundle of inputs may be
decomposed into several sub-bundles. Suppose, moreover, that these sub-bundles di⁄er
in terms of factor intensity, and countries are di⁄erently e¢ cient on the level of sub-
bundles. In what follows, I shall alternatively use the terms sub-bundles, fragments, or
stages of a production process. Certain stages where a country boasts high e¢ ciency
relative to other countries may thus be bundled with other, low e¢ ciency bundles. In
a similar vein, a country￿ s factor prices relative to those of other countries may confer
di⁄erent degrees of (dis)advantage for various such sub-bundles of inputs. In this way,
certain sub-bundles may receive ￿protection￿from being bundled with others. I call this
￿bundling protection￿a⁄orded by the costs of unbundling. By costs of unbundling, I
mean any additional resource use that would follow from locating sub-bundles of inputs
in di⁄erent countries. We must think of these as the minimum cost of whatever is the
most economical organizational, or contractual, arrangement for such unbundling.
An equilibrium with bundling-protection is disturbed by a su¢ ciently large reduction
of the costs of unbundling. Such a reduction may be brought about by technological
improvements in transport and communication, or by an improvement of institutions for
sub-contracting. Loss of bundling-protection implies a new equilibrium, both in terms of
the country￿ s factor prices and its output pattern and, thus, trade. This may be called an
equilibrium with unbundled comparative advantage. It can be described with the aid of a
new factor price frontier, based on a potentially large number of unit-output sub-bundles
of inputs for each good, instead of a single aggregate input bundle.
Unbundling involves a bazaar-e⁄ect in that it reveals a country￿ s comparative disad-
vantage in fragments that have hitherto enjoyed bundling protection and which, deprived
of this protection, are lost to other countries. This alters domestic factor demand. Firms
that move the less skill-intensive lines of their production o⁄shore now demand less low-
skilled labor, which clearly puts downward pressure on wages for this country￿ s low-skilled
workers. However, unbundling also implies that other fragments of various production
processes in this same country will be ￿freed up￿to their full comparative advantage.
If the overall unbundling scenario is such that the fragments relieved from a ￿bundling-
burden￿use much low-skilled labor, relative to the economy￿ s overall endowment ratio,
then the wage pressure on low-skilled workers will be alleviated. This, in essence, is the
general equilibrium channel for what is often called the cost-savings potential, or the
4productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring. Indeed, the analysis below reveals that under certain
conditions low-skilled labor may even gain from such unbundling.
If looked at in this way, a bazaar-e⁄ect in any one industry need not imply that the
industry as a whole shrinks. Depending on the position of the fragment freed up to full
comparative advantage within the economy￿ s cone of diversi￿cation, it may expand in
terms of output sold on world markets. The same applies for the individual ￿rm which
may well thrive while shedding labor on fragments that have fallen victim to international
unbundling. The principle of arbitrage that leads to bazaar-type phenomena simply oper-
ates on a level which is di⁄erent from the ￿rm or the sector. This has potentially serious
policy implications. In particular it may undermine policies that rely on the traditional,
bundled view of the world, such as for instance policies geared towards fostering particu-
lar industries that for whatever reason seem attractive to a country￿ s policy makers. The
outcomes of such policies have become less predictable and the policies, therefore, more
error prone.8
In this paper, I use a model incorporating Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian determinants
of trade, in order to trace out the impact of unbundling comparative advantage on factor
prices and factor allocation. The model assumes two types of labor, high-skilled and
low-skilled, and it focuses on two countries￿￿local￿ comparative advantage. The two
countries, labeled ￿West￿and ￿East￿are assumed to be embedded in world markets for
tradable (￿nal) goods where they face given prices. I ￿rst describe an equilibrium for
bundled comparative advantage in terms of sub-bundles of inputs, but assuming that
unbundling is prohibitively costly (section 2). Then I allow for unbundling and compare
the two equilibria, assuming that wages are free to adjust (section 3). I explore the wage
and welfare e⁄ects, as well as the labor re-allocation resulting from unbundling. I then
redo the analysis under the assumption of a real wage rigidity for low-skilled labor (section
4). And ￿nally, I draw some general conclusions that emerge from the analysis with a
view on trade policy (section (5) and immigration (section 6).
How does the paper relate to the voluminous literature on o⁄shoring? It draws on
Jones (2000) in adapting the Lerner-Pearce diagram to depict fragmentation of produc-
tion. Jones (2000) also was the ￿rst to emphasize that international fragmentation allows
8See the general discussion in Baldwin (2006b).
5countries to uncouple superior fragments of their production processes. Further important
papers along these same lines are Jones & Kierzkowski (2000), Deardor⁄ (2001a,2001b),
and Jones (2005). The contribution of this paper, relative to these earlier ones, is to
provide a full analysis of a two country equilibrium with bundled versus unbundled com-
parative advantage. In line with Deardor⁄ (2004), comparative advantage is de￿ned as
￿local￿concept in a many-country world with real trade costs. The analysis is aimed at
general propositions on how the long-run wage and welfare e⁄ects of unbundling relate
to the pattern of o⁄shoring. I have already derived such propositions in Kohler (2003),
where I allow for an arbitrary number of goods, factors and fragments, or sub-bundles
of inputs. Here, I sharpen the insight by reducing dimensions, and by a closer focus on
Heckscher-Ohlin plus Ricardian comparative advantage in a two-country setup. Ricardian
comparative advantage with traded inputs is also treated, although in a somewhat di⁄er-
ent manner, by Deardor⁄(2005b). The idea that Ricardian di⁄erences across countries in
terms of e¢ ciency, an important element of my story, has also been stressed by Deardor⁄
(2005a).
Framing my analysis in terms of unbundling allows me to bring into sharp analytical
focus the cost-savings, or productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring. The key role of this e⁄ect
in shaping the wage e⁄ects from o⁄shoring has been stressed in two recent papers by
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,2006b) who propose to view o⁄shoring as trade in
tasks (rather than trade in goods).9 The similarity between the notion of tasks and sub-
bundles of inputs is obvious, but there is also a crucial di⁄erence, as will become evident
below. The notion of unbundling, already implicit in Jones (2000), has recently been
taken up by Baldwin (2006b,2006c), in order to identify novel features of globalization. He
interprets the new paradigm of trade in tasks introduced by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg
9Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) contains a more policy oriented discussion plus some empirics,
while its theoretical model is a somewhat stripped down version of Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b).
The productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring is often alluded to in the public debate, and it has been taken up quite
prominently in the empirical literature. See for instance Amiti & Wei (2005a,2005b) and G￿rg & Girma
(2005). I am greatful to Helmut Hesse who has stressed this point in his comments at Ottobeuren, and
also in private conversation, drawing my attention to empirical evidence on the productivity enhancing
e⁄ects of German FDI and outsourcing; see Deutsche Bundesbank, ￿German foreign direct investment
(FDI) relationships: recent trends and macroeconomic e⁄ects￿ , Monthly Report, September 2006, pp. 43
- 83, particularly p. 53.
6(2006b) as unbundling and contrasts this with what he calls ￿Mankiw-o⁄shoring￿ , where
the key aspect is that tradability is extended into the realm of formerly non-tradable
intermediates, with a wage e⁄ect that is equivalent ￿and equally ambiguous ￿to that of
technological progress. In some sense, the present paper is ￿rmly rooted in this earlier
view, which I would call the Jonesian paradigm. However, I show that this paradigm
may usefully be combined with Baldwin￿ s notion of unbundling. And I show that the
ambiguity can be resolved, partly at least, through propositions that tell us how certain
general patterns of unbundling determine the attendant wage e⁄ects.
2 Bundled Comparative Advantage
Throughout this paper, comparative advantage relates to production, not trade. I assume
that domestic demand in the countries is considered negligible for the determination of
world-market prices for goods. Hence, demand ￿and thus trade ￿of these countries
has no in￿ uence on their wages and employment. Moreover, comparative advantage is
de￿ned as a ￿local￿concept, relating to two neighboring countries embedded in a larger
world. As argued by Deardor⁄ (2004), de￿ning comparative advantage in this way is
justi￿ed if trade costs between any one of these two countries and the rest of the world is
signi￿cantly larger than between the two countries themselves. In my analysis, this applies
to the geographical separation of individual fragments of production. Thus, in this paper
comparative advantage is all about ￿who does what￿in two neighboring countries, each
facing given world-market prices for ￿nal goods. This section describes a conventional
equilibrium with bundled comparative advantage, assuming that the entire bundle of
inputs must always be sourced domestically. The subsequent section then considers an
equilibrium where comparative advantage is unbundled, such that it incorporates cost-
minimization through cross-country sourcing of sub-bundles of inputs. Comparing the
equilibria with bundled and unbundled comparative advantage allows us to explore how
unbundling a⁄ects factor prices and employment.
It will become evident that allowing for a minimum amount of industrial diversity in
terms of o⁄shoring characteristics is crucial for the wage e⁄ects of unbundling. I assume
four ￿nal goods, i = 0;:::3; and I allow for potential unbundling only in two of the four
goods, goods 1 and 2. This may re￿ ect prohibitive costs of separating fragments, or a fun-
damental characteristic of technology in producing goods 0 and 3. It is meant to capture
7the obvious fact that industries have di⁄erent ￿o⁄shoring propensities￿ . For simplicity, I
assume only two sub-bundles, or fragments, and two factors, high-skilled and low-skilled
labor, which are immobile between countries, but perfectly mobile across goods. Migra-
tion will be discussed towards the end of the paper. Firms have no market power on
either output or input markets. I will also assume that unbundling comparative advan-
tage between these countries as such does not a⁄ect world market prices. In view of the
bazaar-economy-discussion mentioned in the introduction, what I have in mind is coun-
tries like Germany, henceforth called the ￿West￿ , and nearby Eastern European countries,
who are collectively referred to as the ￿East￿ . With this interpretation, assuming given
world market prices for traded ￿nal goods is a reasonable simpli￿cation.
I simplify by assuming Leontief-type production functions. For industries i = 1;2 in





















In these expressions, s = h;l denotes high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Thus, ais denotes
type-s-labor input requirement per unit of ￿nal good i. I call ais=ail the aggregate skill-
intensity of good i: In the second line, fir denotes the input requirement of a type-r
fragment in good i production, while airs indicates the type-s-labor input requirement
per ￿unit￿ of fragment r. With bundled comparative advantage, equilibrium may be
described relying only on (1), with unbundled comparative advantage, we must rely on
(2). In the following, I shall occasionally use





to denote the ￿level of production￿of fragment r in industry i, although there need not
be a tangible output associated with a fragment. Outputs in industries 0 and 3, may be
described according to simple expressions similar to (1), but without any decomposition
into sub-bundles as in (2).10
10The model can be interpreted in a more general and somewhat more satisfactory way by assuming
that capital as a third factor is separable from labor inputs and adjusts endogenously according to a
standard neoclassical production function, and an appropriate no-arbitrage condition that re￿ ects perfect
international capital mobility with a given capital rental in terms of the numØraire.
8Although I use A and B to denote the two fragments in both goods, fragment A of
good-1-production may be a wholly di⁄erent type of activity from fragment A in good-2-
production. Skill-intensities drive the Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism of o⁄shoring. Without
loss of generality, I assume fragment A to be the more skill-intensive one in both industries.
In addition, I assume Ricardian productivity di⁄erences on the level of fragments, as in
Jones (2000) and Deardor⁄(2005a). I assume these to be Hicks-neutral. Using an asterisk
to denote the East, we thus have
f
￿
ir = ￿irfir with ￿ir > 0: (4)
I do not assume that ￿ir ￿ 1 for all i and r; hence there may be certain activities within an
industry where the East has superior productivity. It should be noted that airs = a￿
irs for
all i;r and s: Thus, Ricardian di⁄erences are restricted to the ￿fragment-productivities￿
1=fir. With such Ricardian productivity gaps, the two countries may produce any one
good with a di⁄erent aggregate skill-intensity. I assume good 1 to be more skill-intensive
than good 2 in both countries.
Factor endowments in terms of e¢ ciency units are denoted by Eh=El and E￿
h=E￿
l , and










where ws and w￿
s denote wage rates in the two countries, with s = h (l) for high-skilled
(low-skilled) labor. In the analysis below, whenever I state that the West (East) has an
e¢ ciency advantage in a certain activity, this means that an equal amount of e¢ ciency
units of both types of labor generates a larger output in the West than the East (East than
the West). An e¢ ciency advantage in the East is perfectly consistent with the East using
a larger amount of physical units of labor than the West. Lower wages for physical units
of both high-skilled and low-skilled labor are thus interpreted as re￿ ecting Harrod-neutral
technological superiority of the West.
I use pi to denote the given price of good i relative to good 2 which is the numØraire.
Equilibrium requires that ￿rms in each country make zero-pro￿ts on goods produced,
and have minimum unit-cost in excess of prices for all goods not produced domestically.
With perfect wage ￿ exibility, equilibrium also requires full employment. In a subsequent
section, I shall also look at the case where a minimum real wage rate causes unemployment
in the West. With complete bundling, zero-pro￿ts imply








l ; i = 0:::3; (6)
9with associated complementary slackness conditions stating that outputs yi or y￿
i are zero
if strict inequalities apply. Full employment requires
a0hy0 + a1hy1 + a2hy2 + a3hy3 = Eh and a0ly0 + a1ly1 + a2ly2 + a3ly3 = El; (7)
and accordingly for the East. The aggregate skill-intensity of any good can be expressed
as a weighted average of the skill-intensity of individual components, with the relative
importance of these components serving as weights:11
aih=ail = ￿iA(aiAh=aiAl) + ￿iB(aiBh=aiBl): (8)
Given world market prices, conditions (6) and (7) determine wage rates and output
levels for the East and the West. In equilibrium, each country produces a subset of goods,
depending on its technology, its factor endowment, and ￿potentially ￿on its trade policy.
With two primary factors and 4 goods, equilibrium output levels need not be unique, as
is well known, but for a large part of my analysis this indeterminacy is no problem. At
this stage, I make no special assumption about the speci￿c production pattern in the two
countries.12 I do assume, however, that the trading equilibrium features a wage gap as
given in (5). The wage gap is, of course, endogenous. But assuming wh=wl < w￿
h=w￿
l
makes sense empirically, and assuming it directly poses no analytical problem, while
making the analysis easy. Of course, with arbitrary Ricardian di⁄erences and/or di⁄er-
ences in tastes between East and West, and with arbitrary trade policies (if any) of the
two countries, a trading equilibrium could well exhibit an opposite wage inequality, even
with Eh=El > E￿
h=E￿
l ; or it could feature factor price equalization. Therefore, assuming
wh=wl < w￿
h=w￿
l for the bundled comparative advantage trading equilibrium implies an un-
speci￿ed restriction on the underlying di⁄erences in endowments and technology. Loosely
speaking, I assume that endowment di⁄erences dominate the factor price di⁄erences that
remain in the trading equilibrium.
11It can be shown that aih=ail = ￿iA(aiAh=aiAl) + ￿iB(aiBh=aiBl), where ￿iA = ~ ￿iA=(~ ￿iA + ~ ￿iB) and
￿iB = ~ ￿iB=(~ ￿iA + ~ ￿iB), with ~ ￿iA = fiA=fiB and ~ ￿iB = aiBl=￿iAl: We have ￿iA + ￿iB = 1, hence the
aggregate skill-intensity of ￿nal good i is a weighted average of the skill-intensities of fragments A and
B: Notice that my Ricardian di⁄erences in technology imply that ~ ￿
￿
iB = ~ ￿iB; while ~ ￿
￿
iA = ~ ￿iA(￿iA=￿1B).
12For the analysis to make sense, I must assume that both the East and West produce at least one of
the two goods 1 and 2.
10The zero-pro￿t conditions (6) assume that the same ￿nal goods prices hold in the East
and the West. In other words, it assumes free trade. It will become obvious as I go along
that the analysis is easily extended to the case where each of the two countries runs its own
trade policy, whence world market prices would simply be replaced by policy-distorted
domestic prices in the West and the East. I shall return to a consideration of some trade
policy issues in the section 5 below.
What is the economic value generated by the sub-bundle of inputs fa1Bh;a1Blg in the
West? With complete bundling, its value derives from being combined, domestically, with
sub-bundle fa1Ah;a1Alg towards production of good 1. Given wage rates fwh;wlg, this
value may be written as
￿1B(wh;wl) ￿ [p1 ￿ f1A(a1Ahwh + a1Alwl)]/fiB: (9)
A reciprocal de￿nition holds for fragment A: In what follows, I call ￿ir(wh;wl) the implicit
(or imputed) price of fragment r under complete bundling of production 1 within the West.
13 With this de￿nition, we may rewrite the zero-pro￿t condition for good 1 in the West
as
￿1B(wh;wl) = a1Bhwh + a1Blwl; (10)
assuming that good 1 is produced in the West. This states that the value generated by a
￿unit￿of fragment B in industry 1 is equal to its cost. This same condition can also be
expressed in terms of the implicit price of fragment A, ￿1A(wh;wl). Bundled comparative
advantage rules out all trade in these fragments. The implicit price derives from being
bundled, within the same country, with the other fragment. With this de￿nition of ￿1B;
the bundle fa1Bh=￿1B;a1Bl=￿1Bg of labor used for fragment B represents an activity with
an imputed value equal to 1.












f1r(a1rhwh + a1rlwl): (11)
With (4), this puts a restriction on ￿1A and ￿1B that depends on the international di⁄er-
ence in wage rates, fwh;wlg and fw￿
h;w￿
l g with inequality as in (5), given the Leontief-
13The notion of an implicit price is crucial for my analysis. In Kohler (2003,2004a), I have used the
term e⁄ective price. See also Deardor⁄ (2005a). There is an obvious analogy to the e⁄ective price in the
theory of e⁄ective protection; see Ethier (1977).
11coe¢ cients for the two fragments involved. A corresponding restriction obtains for good
2 to be viable in both the East and the West. A possible equilibrium with fully integrated
processes and both countries producing goods 1 and 2 is depicted in ￿gure 1, where goods
0 and 3 are assumed to be at the opposite extremes of the skill-intensity ranking. I use
Lh and Ll as generic terms to indicate amounts of high-skilled and low-skilled labor on
the two axes. The L-shaped isoquants represent aggregate factor bundles that generate
a unit value of the respective good, given commodity prices and the respective country￿ s
technology. The production pattern and wage rates for an equilibrium with bundled com-
parative advantage now depend on the two country￿ s endowment ratios. In particular,
the wage ratios wh=wl and w￿
h=w￿
l may be read o⁄the slope of the convex hull connecting
a country￿ s unit-value isoquants where it intersects with that country￿ s endowment ray;
see Jones (2000,2005). The convex hulls are ZV UTS for the West, and ZV B￿TS for the
East. It is easy to envisage such endowment rays leading to the equilibrium wage rates
depicted in ￿gure 1, with wh=wl < w￿
h=w￿
l as assumed in (5).
Let us ￿rst brie￿ y look at the West. An integrated labor bundle corresponding to the
line segment OB; with an aggregate skill-intensity equal to ￿1h=a1l, has unit-cost and it
generates unit-value in industry 1. This is composed of two sub-bundles corresponding to
the two line segments OA and AB. The bundle OA0 represents a factor bundle with im-
plicit unit-value, i.e., fa1Ah=￿1A;a1Al=￿1Ag with the implicit price ￿1A de￿ned in complete
analogy to ￿iB above. One might also view this factor bundle as belonging to a unit-value-
added isoquant for the ￿nal good 1; treating fragment B as a required intermediate good,
alongside labor in fragment A; and assuming that the intermediate is obtained from do-
mestic producers who make zero-pro￿ts.14 To avoid clutter, the corresponding unit-value
labor bundles for other Western fragments are not drawn.
In the case depicted, since the aggregate skill-intensity of good 1 exceeds the ra-
tio ￿ ah=￿ al; de￿ned by the intersection of the two factor price lines, the East has a cost-
disadvantage in good 1 from a relatively higher wage for high-skilled labor15. But this is
o⁄set by su¢ ciently large Ricardian advantage in fragment B; i.e., by ￿1B < 1, leading
to an Eastern unit-value isoquant with vertex B￿; as opposed to B for the West. The
14Compare this to Deardor⁄ (2005a, p.264). See also Jones (2000).
15This critical ratio ￿ ah=￿ al corresponds to the intersection point of the two factor price lines. Thus,
￿ al = (1=w￿
h ￿ 1=wh)/(w￿
l =w￿
h ￿ wl=wh), and analogously for ￿ ah.
12corresponding fragment-A-bundle with a unit-implicit-value, i.e., fa1Ah=￿￿
1A;a1Al=￿￿
1Ag, is
given by point A0￿. This implies an absolute disadvantage for the East in fragment A:
A uniform Ricardian advantage of the East across both fragments, ￿1A = ￿1B < 1, with
zero-pro￿ts with the same Eastern wage rates, would imply a unit-value isoquant with
vertex at point B0: A case where ￿1A = 1, with ￿1B su¢ ciently below unity would lead to
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Figure 1: Bundled comparative advantage and factor prices
with offsetting Ricardian efficiency gaps
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Figure 1 depicts a trading equilibrium with bundled comparative advantage, whereby
the East has a relatively ine¢ cient fragment A. This is further aggravated by the fact
that fragment A is relatively skill-intensive, but the fragment receives implicit protection
from being bundled with fragment B, where the East is relatively e¢ cient, and where
13the cost disadvantage from its relatively expensive high-skilled labor is less severe. In a
similar vein, the ￿gure assumes that in industry 2 the West is technologically superior
in the relatively skill-intensive fragment A in industry 2, which by assumption exhibits
a lower aggregate skill-intensity than industry 1, and also a skill-intensity lower than
￿ ah=￿ al. Assuming a Ricardian e¢ ciency advantage of the West in the relatively high-
skill-intensive fragment A, and conversely for fragment B; i.e., ￿2A > 1 > ￿2B, the West
produces good 2 with a lower aggregate skill-intensity than the East, where we observe
a￿
2h=a￿
2l as depicted.16 An important upshot of the Ricardian element in my story is what
I call a ￿thick margin￿of comparative advantage: Even with wage rates di⁄ering across
countries, there is more than one industry which is viable in both countries, which is an
obvious fact in reality.17
In the case depicted, within each of the two industries each of the two countries has a
Ricardian advantage in the activity that uses its relatively abundant (and relatively cheap)
factor more intensively. As a result, both industries operate in a less skill-intensive manner
in the skill-abundant West. Similarly, in the East which is abundant in low-skilled labor,
both industries are operating with a lower ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled workers.
For subsequent reference, I call this a case with o⁄setting Ricardian e¢ ciency gaps, since
the comparative advantage from the endowment di⁄erence is mitigated by the fact that
the more skill-abundant country produces all goods with a lower skill-intensity than the
country where skills are relatively scarce.
It might seem natural to anchor fragment-related Ricardian di⁄erences in this way,
particularly if factor price di⁄erences themselves derive from given fundamental technolog-
ical di⁄erences, as in Deardor⁄(2005a), or if endowments are endogenous to technological
di⁄erences, due to international factor movements, as in Markusen (1983). However, the
pattern of ￿ir should be seen as endogenous. In the present context, an argument can be
made that they should be endogenous to factor price di⁄erences and, thus, to endowments.
The thrust of this argument, in brief, runs as follows. First, methods to enhance produc-
tivity of certain sub-bundles of inputs should be viewed as an integral part of technological
knowledge which is universally available. The challenge, then, is to explain a certain pat-
16Remember that our de￿nition of the e¢ ciency parameters is such that an absolute advantage in the
West implies ￿ir > 1.
17Deardor⁄ (1979) was among the ￿rst to explore such equilibria.
14tern of ￿iA 6= 1 across fragments in equilibrium. Any ￿ir < 1 (or ￿ir > 1) means that ￿rms
in the West (East) forgo a technological improvement that ￿rms in the East (West) have
secured in fragment r of industry i. Obviously, patent protection is implausible for such
e¢ ciency gaps. Then, for a case with ￿ir < 1 (and thus fir > f￿
ir) to be an equilibrium,
the marginal cost of e¢ ciency improving e⁄orts in the West need to be larger than the
marginal bene￿ts from the resulting reduction in the per-unit requirement of fragment
r in industry i. Similarly for ￿ir > 1 in the East. Suppose, therefore, that e⁄orts to-
wards increasing productivities 1=fir and 1=f￿
ir require di⁄erent proportions of high- and
low-skilled labor for r = A;B: If wh=wl < w￿
h=w￿
l , as assumed, and if e⁄orts towards
productivity improvements in the more (less) skill-intensive fragments A are themselves
also more (less) skill-intensive, then the wage gap in￿ icts a relative cost-disadvantage on
the West for e¢ ciency-improving e⁄orts in fragments B, and conversely for the East. In
this way, the incentive for improving e¢ ciency in skill-intensive fragments may peter out
in the East even with ￿iA > 1: Conversely for the West with ￿1B < 1. This corresponds
to the case assumed in ￿gure 1, which I have called o⁄setting Ricardian e¢ ciency gaps
above. An opposite skill-intensity pattern of productivity-enhancing e⁄orts would suggest
an opposite pattern of e¢ ciency gaps, with ￿iA < 1, i.e., relative ine¢ ciency of the West
in skill-intensive fragments. As a result, the more skill-abundant West would need more
of the skill-intensive fragment per unit of output produced of any one good than the East.
The West would then also exhibit a larger aggregate skill-intensity in both industries, 1
and 2. I refer to this case as reinforcing Ricardian e¢ ciency gaps.
Given the wage inequality between East and West, the pattern of e¢ ciency gaps is cru-
cial for the pattern of bundling protection that is implicit in an equilibrium with bundled
comparative advantage. It will, therefore, also be crucial for the wage and employment
e⁄ects of unbundling considered in the next section. I do not want to tie my analysis any
speci￿c pattern of ￿ir. The propositions to be derived below can be interpreted against
the backdrop of the distinction between o⁄setting and reinforcing patterns.
3 Unbundling of Comparative Advantage
In his recent paper on globalization, Baldwin (2006b) notes that ￿economists really do
not understand the ￿ glue￿that binds production stages and tasks together￿(p.29). Up to
this point, I have simply assumed that there is no e⁄ective ￿ glue￿across country borders.
15Unbundling now implies that cross-border gluing is possible between West and East. More
speci￿cally, I assume it is possible between di⁄erent fragments, or input-sub-bundles, but
not between di⁄erent types of labor directly. This is an important assumption, as will
become evident below. Also, the glue is likely to be costly. In analytical terms, this may be
captured by a suitable reinterpretation of ￿ir which describes productivity of an Eastern
input-sub-bundle r in process i, relative to Western productivity. One may now interpret
a higher or lower value of ￿ir as re￿ ecting not just Eastern productivity as such, but also
a higher or lower amount of resources necessary to ￿glue￿fragments operated in the East
into the respective value-added chain in the West. However, with this reinterpretation of
￿ir; the term ￿irfir no longer gives the Eastern input requirement for a fragment produced
locally in the East; see equation (4). If ￿ir > 1 denotes the relevant iceberg-type cost
parameter, and if these costs are symmetric in either direction, then the requirement of
fragment r located in the East per unit of good i, provided the companion fragment is







And if the East sources fragment r in the West, then the per unit requirement is fir￿ir,
if the companion fragment is located in the East. It is obvious that unbundling can now
be thought of being triggered by a reduction in ￿ir.
As with the narrower interpretation of ￿ir in the previous section, we face the question
of whether it is easier to o⁄shore high-skill intensive fragments than low-skill-intensive
ones (variation across r = A;B), and whether o⁄shoring is easier in the more skill-
intensive of the two industries (variation across i = 1;2). Ideally, one would model the
￿economics of gluing￿explicitly. Doing so in a serious way would very quickly lead to
￿xed cost elements, thus questioning the iceberg-analogy that I have invoked above.18
This is certainly a serious issue, but for the present purpose the iceberg-analogy seems
18See Baldwin (2006b) and Harris (2001). The literature focusing on the organizational form of interna-
tional fragmentation typically assumes varying ￿xed costs of ￿gluing￿ ; see Antr￿s & Helpman (2004). See
also Kohler (2001,2004b), where I allow for ￿xed costs in Ricardo-Viner-type models of o⁄shoring. One
could also envisage Heckscher-Ohlin-type stories where gluing is characterized by a certain skill-intensity,
related (or not) to the skill-intensity of the fragments glued. Jones (2005) shows that exploiting the cost
advantage from international fragmentation subject to a ￿xed ￿gluing-cost￿leads to a concave minimum
cost function.
16justi￿ed.
A separate issue is how we de￿ne the smallest unit where cross-country gluing is
possible. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b) essentially assume a single input-bundle,
but allow for gluing within each type of labor, such that the overall low-skilled labor input
may be obtained from domestic or foreign labor markets, and similarly for high-skilled
labor. They assume that, within each type of labor, the glue works di⁄erently well over
a whole range of tasks. Cost-minimization then determines the share of tasks obtained
from o⁄shore. High- and low-skilled labor, thus composed in (continuously) variable
shares of domestic and foreign workers, are then combined in the usual way according
to a standard production function. In a sense, this is the extremest form of unbundling,
in Baldwin￿ s (2006b) words: ￿globalization￿ s ￿nest level of resolution￿(p.28). In Kohler
(2001,2004b) I have looked at this type of o⁄shoring in a small-country, Ricardo-Viner
setup. Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) present a full-￿ edged Heckscher-Ohlin model
with a richer set of results.19 In the present paper, unbundling takes place on the lower
level of ￿resolution￿that relates to well-de￿ned bundles of high- and low-skilled labor,
and not to individual high- or low-skilled workers. Call-centers operating o⁄shore (used
to handle customer complaints, say) still need both high- and low-skilled workers, both
from the foreign labor market, but in a di⁄erent proportion from other fragments of the
o⁄shoring ￿rm￿ s overall production process. Arguably, this is a somewhat less immediate
threat than direct arbitrage on the level of the individual worker. Di⁄erent technologies
(goods) permit di⁄erent levels of ￿resolution￿in international fragmentation. Ultimately,
this is an empirical issue.
Let us begin by returning to the equilibrium with complete bundling. I assume that
both countries produce goods 1 and 2 in the initial equilibrium, hence equation (11) plus a
corresponding condition for industry 2 must be satis￿ed. Unbundling now enforces inter-
national arbitrage on the level of input-sub-bundles, rather than goods. Thus, producing
fragment r of industry i in the West would violate cost-minimization at initial wage rates,
if airhwh+airlwl > ￿ir(airhw￿
h+airlw￿
l ). This is the o⁄shoring perspective from a Western
19In the Ricardo-Viner model, gluing foreign with home labor is subject to the usual law of diminishing
returns. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model of Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b), a continuous margin of
o⁄shoring arises due to convexity of ￿gluing-cost￿over the range of tasks. In Kohler (2004a), I present a
Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuous margin of o⁄shoring in input-bundles.
17point of view. Similarly, producing fragment r of industry i in the East at initial factor
prices would violate cost-minimization, if airhwh+airlwl < [￿ir(airhw￿
h+airlw￿
l )]=￿ir. Obvi-
ously, ￿ir > 1 opens up a band of arbitrage-free di⁄erences in unit-cost between countries.
Suppose, for simplicity, that all gluing costs fall to zero, in which case ￿ir = 1. Then,
with (11) satis￿ed in the initial equilibrium, and with heterogeneous fragments in terms
of skill-intensities and Ricardian advantage, an integration production pattern necessarily
violates the unbundling-cost-minimization. This is true whatever the detailed pattern of
Ricardian advantages ￿ir. But the direction of disequilibrium and the subsequent adjust-
ment of production and wages depends on this pattern.
If the Ricardian advantages are neutral throughout, ￿1A = ￿1B = ￿1 < 1 and ￿2A =
￿2B = ￿2 > 1, then a￿
irh=a￿
il = airh=airl, and the West has a comparative advantage in
the skill-intensive fragments of both, industries 1 and 2.20 Conversely for the East. Take
good 1 for example. From (11), if the East produces good 2, its Ricardian advantage is
strong enough to compensate for the cost-disadvantage deriving from relatively expensive
high-skilled labor, given the aggregate skill-intensity of good 1. This then implies that the
less skill-intensive of the two fragments must cost less to produce in the East than in the
West. Vice versa for the more skill-intensive fragment A: The same holds true, a fortiori,
if ￿1B < ￿1 (and therefore ￿1A > ￿1B from equation 11), i.e., if the Ricardian e¢ ciency
gaps are of a reinforcing type. On the other hand, for o⁄setting Ricardian gaps there
exists a critical value ~ ￿1A < ￿1 (with a corresponding value ~ ￿1B > ￿1; again determined by
equation 11), such that any ￿1A < ~ ￿1A (and ￿1B > ~ ￿1B) confers a comparative advantage
to the East (the West) in supplying fragment A (fragment B) of industry 1. The same
patterns of unbundling obtain for good 2, if the Ricardian e¢ ciency gaps are of the
reinforcing or o⁄setting type there as well. Thus, o⁄setting Ricardian advantages may
give rise to a somewhat counter-intuitive pattern of unbundling, whence the West sources
skill-intensive fragments in the East.21
In the preceding arguments, I have identi￿ed unbundled comparative advantage from
the direction in which the cost-minimizing sourcing-condition would be violated, if o⁄-
shoring did not take place in either direction. This does not yet describe the trading
20Here ￿1 is de￿ned from equation (11), setting ￿1A = ￿1B = ￿1.
21Marin (2004) presents evidence for such skill-intensive German and Austrian o⁄shoring to Eastern
Europe.
18equilibrium with unbundled comparative advantage. Denoting the equilibrium with un-
bundling by a tilde (~), the cost-minimization conditions for unbundling may be described
as
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where ~ gir ￿de￿ned in (3) above ￿denotes the equilibrium level of production of fragment
r in industry i that takes place in the West, and analogously for ~ g￿
ir in the East. The
inequalities in these expressions describe what I have called margins of international frag-
mentation in Kohler (2003). They separate fragments produced domestically from those
produced o⁄shore. Conditions (13) and (14) might also be called the cost-minimizing
￿supply-chain-conditions￿ . Given my working hypothesis of incomplete specialization un-
der bundled comparative advantage, and given ￿ir = 1, equilibrium with unbundling
requires that each of the two countries produces only one of the fragments in each of the
two industries. In other words, unbundling does take place, its precise pattern depending
on the pattern of Ricardian advantages as explained above.
To complete description of the equilibrium, I now de￿ne
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These are the implicit prices of the two fragments in industry i, given that they are pro-
duced in the West, with the companion fragment produced o⁄shore in the East. In other
words, they are imputed prices for home-made fragments, each conditional on o⁄shoring
of the other fragment. Analogous de￿nitions hold for fragments produced in the East.
Note that (15) and (16) are de￿nitions, not equilibrium conditions.
The cost-minimizing supply-chain-conditions in (10) and (14) do not guarantee zero-
pro￿ts for ￿nal goods production. Using the de￿nitions in (15) and (16), the zero-pro￿t
conditions for a trading equilibrium with unbundled comparative advantage may be writ-
ten as
~ ￿ir(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ) = airh ~ wh + airl ~ wl
~ ￿￿
ir(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ) < airh ~ w￿
h + airl ~ w￿
l
)
if ~ gir > 0 and ~ g
￿
ir = 0; (17)
~ ￿ir(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ) < airh ~ wh + airl ~ wl
~ ￿￿
ir(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ) = airh ~ w￿
h + airl ~ w￿
l
)
if ~ gir = 0 and ~ g
￿
ir > 0; (18)
19where i = 1;2 and r = A;B. In these expressions, ~ gir and ~ g￿
ir are determined in line
with the cost-minimizing supply-chain-conditions in (10) and (14). Within each industry,
the imputed value the domestic fragment, conditional on o⁄shoring the other must be
equal to the unit-cost of this fragment. Analogously for fragments produced in the East,
with o⁄shoring of the other to the West.22 If the domestic unit-cost of any fragment
is larger than its implicit price for home production, then it is produced o⁄shore and
domestic production of that fragment is zero. Conventional zero-pro￿t conditions hold for
industries 0 and 3. General equilibrium is then completed by full employment conditions,







airs~ gir + a3s~ y3 = Es for s = h;l: (19)
I shall discuss this equilibrium in comparison with the benchmark case of bundled com-
parative advantage with the aid of ￿gure 2 below.
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models with more goods than factors exhibit an ex-
treme sensitivity with respect to changes in prices and trade costs. Even small changes
can cause extreme shifts in comparative advantage.23 In the present context, unbundling
may be caused by a small change in real costs of unbundling, but this may result in an
extreme shift in the pattern of comparative advantage. This is an uncomfortable feature,
but some important insights may still be obtained with the present model, particularly
regarding the wage e⁄ects of unbundling.24 Given the discrete change in the specialization
pattern, these cannot be described directly by means of a small-changes-calculus using
linear approximations for equilibrium conditions. However, the implicit prices de￿ned
above provide a useful vehicle to do something very similar.
22Of course, if cost-minimization dictates that there be no o⁄shoring, then these imputed values, which
are conditional upon o⁄shoring, would be lower than their unit-cost for both fragments. But this case has
been ruled out here by assuming incomplete specialization with bundled comparative advantage, coupled
with the simplifying assumption that ￿ir = 1.
23In his Graham Lecture at Princeton, Alan Deardor⁄ speaks of hypersensitivity and lists it among 6
uncomfortable features of the Heckscher-Ohlin model; see Deardor⁄ (2006).
24An alternative to the approach pursued here would be to impose conditions that allow one to model
o⁄shoring as a movement along a continuous margin, as in Kohler (2004a) and Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg (2006b).
20I focus on wage e⁄ects of unbundling in the West. By assumption of incomplete
specialization, the initial equilibrium satis￿es ￿ir(wh;wl) = airhwh+airlwl for i = 1;2 and
r = A;B, where the implicit price is as de￿ned in (10) for i = 1 and r = B. Comparing this
with the zero-pro￿t conditions (17) and (18), the wage e⁄ects from unbundling, ~ ws ￿ ws,
must satisfy the change from zero-pro￿ts with ￿ir(wh;wl) = airhwh + airlwl for i = 1;2
and r = A;B (plus the corresponding conditions for the conventional sectors 0 and 3),
to conditions (17) and (18). But, starting from a case with incomplete specialization,
arbitrary changes ~ ￿ir(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ) ￿ ￿ir(wh;wl) will typically involve extreme shifts in
specialization. Hence, the wage e⁄ects cannot be fully described by looking at the zero-
pro￿t conditions alone. The full employment conditions matter as well. I bring them into
the picture in ￿gure 2, where the change from ￿ir(wh;wl) to ~ ￿ir(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ) is depicted
by inward-pointing arrows along factor intensity rays.
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Figure 2: Unbundled comparative advantage and factor prices
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21Figure 2 looks at the West and assumes that unbundling moves the source of supply
for both of the high-skill intensive fragments to the East. In fact, the West turns out to
lose industry 2 entirely. To understand this ￿gure, we ￿rst need to describe the changes
in imputed prices. It can be shown that the percentage change in the imputed price for
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where ￿ir is the share of fragment r in the unit-cost of good i: Equation (20) represents
the cost-saving that industry i ￿rms in the West obtain from relocating production of
fragment A to the East, taking into account that unbundling of comparative advantage
will also change wage rates in the East from w￿
s to ~ w￿
s. In (20), these cost-savings are
expressed as a percentage increase in the imputed price for fragment B, which remains
being produced in the West. Given the above assumptions, the bracketed term in (20)
is positive, if cost-minimization dictates that fragment A of industry i be sourced in the
East.26
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b, p.6) state that the productivity e⁄ect of o⁄-
shoring has received relatively little explicit attention in theoretical models of o⁄shoring.
Following Kohler (2003), I portray the cost-savings e⁄ect of unbundling as changes in
the implicit values of certain sub-bundles of labor that are ￿freed up￿from the burden of
being bundled with other, less e¢ cient fragments of production. Returning to the notion of
￿bundling protection￿ , we may interpret the term￿iA (aiAhw￿
h + aiAlw￿
l )/(aiAhwh + aiAlwl)
appearing in (20) as measuring the amount of protection that fragment A in the West
receives from fragment B in the initial equilibrium with bundled comparative advantage.
O⁄shoring fragment A relieves fragment B from this burden. The attendant increase in its
implicit value mandates higher wages paid to workers used in fragment B of good i produc-
tion. The Heckscher-Ohlin aspect of this is given by (aiAhw￿
h + aiAlw￿
l )/(aiAhwh + aiAlwl),








pi￿fiA(aiAhwh+aiAlwl) . Zero pro￿ts
initially implies that the denominator of this expression may be written as fiA(aiAhwh + aiAlwl). Using
f￿













With minor manipulations, we arrive at the expression in the text above.
26Strictly speaking, this requires that unbundling of comparative advantage does not reverse the relative
factor price ranking between the two countries, which no doubt is a reasonable assumption in the present
context.





l ) measures the extent to which the initial foreign advantage in fragment A
is reduced by the foreign wage e⁄ects of unbundling, the assumption here being that un-
bundling leaves the international relative factor price ranking unchanged. The general
equilibrium wage e⁄ects of any scenario of simultaneous unbundling in many industries
is then found by comparing the convex hull determined by prices of bundled activities
with the convex hull determined by implicit values of unbundled activities, conditional on
o⁄shoring bundles where domestic production su⁄ers from a Heckscher-Ohlin (i.e., factor
price) disadvantage in connection with a Ricardian e¢ ciency gap.27
Invoking Stolper-Samuelson logic to identify the wage e⁄ect from such unbundling,
we realize that the crucial question is whether the activity that enjoys an increase in its
implicit market value is relatively skill-intensive. But skill-intensive not relative to the
activity that is now located o⁄shore, but relative to other activities that remain viable
domestically. There may, in general, be many such activities, hence a general result seems
hard to derive. However, the domestic skill endowment is a convenient measure of the
overall skill-intensity of a country￿ s production. In order to derive general statements,
I therefore introduce two de￿nitions regarding the skill-intensity of an industry with re-
spect to a country￿ s endowment and its local comparative advantage. The de￿nitions are
introduced for the West, but it is obvious that analogous de￿nitions hold for the East.
De￿nition 1 (a) I call an industry with a bundled aggregate skill-intensity which is lower
than the endowment ratio, aih=ail < Eh=El, a weak comparative advantage industry. In-
dustries with a higher aggregate skill-intensity are called strong comparative advantage
industries.
(b) Industries with unbundled skill-intensities that satisfy airh=airl < Eh=El, for all r are
referred to as industries ￿close to the margin￿of local comparative advantage. Industries
for which an opposite inequality applies are labelled ￿distant from the margin￿ of local
comparative advantage.
These de￿nitions only look at the Hechscher-Ohlin element of comparative advantage
27In the present setup, unbundling takes the form of a discrete change and the productivity e⁄ect arises
even if we start from zero o⁄shoring. In Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b), as in Kohler (2004b), the
productivity e⁄ect does not arise ￿at the very beginning￿with zero o⁄shoring to start with.
23and do not take into account Ricardian e¢ ciency gaps which are equally important in
determining a country￿ s output pattern. Part (b), as well as the subsequent propositions,
allow for more than just two fragments, although my proof which relies on the Lerner-
Pearce diagram takes the case of two fragments, r = A;B; whereby within the industry
fragment A is always a more skill-intensive fragment than B: The two types of industries
de￿ned in part (b) need not be exhaustive. We can now state the following proposition
regarding wage e⁄ects of unbundling of comparative advantage.
Proposition 1 (a) If unbundling takes place only in weak comparative advantage indus-
tries, and if unbundling destroys domestic viability of more skill-intensive bundles (type-A
fragments), then low-skilled labor gains from unbundling, while high-skilled labor su⁄ers
from a lower real wage rate.
(b) If unbundling takes place only in strong comparative advantage industries, and if un-
bundling destroys domestic viability of less skill-intensive bundles (type-B fragments), then
high-skilled labor gains from unbundling, while low-skilled labor loses in terms of a lower
real wage rate.
(c) If unbundling takes place only in industries close to the margin of local comparative
advantage, then high-skilled labor unambiguously su⁄ers from a real wage reduction, while
low-skilled labor gains, irrespective of any detailed structure of unbundling.
(d) If unbundling takes place only in industries that are distant from the margin of local
comparative, then high-skilled labor unambiguously gains, while low-skilled labor loses in
terms of a lower real wage rate, irrespective of any detailed structure of unbundling.
I prove these statements using the Lerner-Pearce diagram. Figure 2 depicts a case
where unbundling takes place in line with part (a) of the proposition. The underlying
assumption is that Ricardian e¢ ciency gaps are of a reinforcing type. Remember that
reinforcing gaps mean that the skill-abundant West produces both goods with a higher
skill-intensity than the East where skills are relatively scarce, because in either industry
the West has a Ricardian disadvantage in the more skill-intensive of the two fragments
(i.e., fragment A). Assuming that ￿iA < ~ ￿iA for both i = 1;2, in both industries the more
skill-intensive of the two fragments loses viability in the West. With bundled compar-
ative advantage, there are unit-value isoquants for gir in either country that lie on the
relevant equilibrium segment of the Hicksian convex hull, or on that line extended in a
linear fashion, as with g2B in ￿gure 2. Their positions are in line with the pre-unbundling
24implicit prices ￿ir(wh;wl). For instance, the vertex for g1A(Lh;Ll) = 1=￿1A is labeled A
0
1
in ￿gure 1. Unbundling of comparative advantage moves these unit-value isoquants in-
ward for fragments B; in line with the new implicit values ~ ￿iB(~ wh; ~ wl; ~ w￿
h; ~ w￿
l ); depending
on the change described in (20). The convex hull now emerges as the line connecting
ZV (1=~ ￿1B)(1=~ ￿2B)TS: The general equilibrium wage rates corresponding to this hull de-
pend on the endowment ratio. Figure 2 depicts an endowment point fEh;Elg in line with
part (a) of the above proposition, with the wage rate for skilled labor falling from wh to
~ wh; and the wage for low-skilled labor rising from wl to ~ wl. This is coupled with an ex-
treme shift in specialization with the only remaining activities of unbundled comparative
advantage being industry 0 and fragment B of industry 2: It is relatively obvious that
￿gure 2 generalizes to the general propositions 1 (a) and (b) above, although the detailed
pattern of unbundled comparative advantage may vary.
Propositions 1 (a) and 1 (b) are in line with the intuition underlying the ￿ndings of
the empirical literature on outsourcing, as mentioned in the introduction. However, that
intuition is potentially misleading. To see this, we only need to change the endowment
point to fE0
h;E0
lg, in which case the line segment (1=~ ￿1B)(1=~ ￿2B) of the convex hull
becomes relevant. Now high-skilled labor gains, while low-skilled labor loses. The crucial
point here is that, relative to the earlier case, the economy is much less skill abundant. It
cannot ￿nd full employment without producing fragment B of industry 2. Although it is
still true that the fragments with lower skill-ratios have been ￿freed-up￿from protecting
less e¢ cient, high-skill-intensive fragments, among the two freed-up fragments (the less
skill-intensive fragments B in both industries), it is the more skill-intensive where the
productivity e⁄ect is larger, viz. fragment A in industry 1. Given the less pronounced
skill abundance in fE0
h;E0
lg relative to fEh;Elg, Stolper-Samuelson logic requires that
high-skilled labor gains while low-skilled labor loses. The corresponding factor price line
is not drawn in ￿gure 2 to avoid clutter. Propositions 1 (c) and (d) include further
cases where the simple intuition is misleading, since the wage e⁄ects are independent on
whether or not unbundling leaves the more skill part(s) of the value added chain viable.
It is relatively easy to construct cases where the intuition is supported and cases where
it is violated, following the general line of reasoning underlying ￿gure 2.
It should be instructive to compare proposition 1 with the result obtained by Grossman
& Rossi-Hansberg (2006c), who move to the far extreme of allowing a direct import of low-
skill- or high-skill-intensive tasks, respectively, as opposed to o⁄shoring of pre-speci￿ed
25bundles composed of both types of workers. This allows them to capture the productivity
e⁄ect of o⁄shoring in a straightforward and appealing way. To see how, take low-skilled
labor. Assuming that some low-skill-type tasks are already obtained from o⁄shore in
the initial equilibrium, any reduction in o⁄shoring costs lowers the costs of these infra-
marginal tasks, and thus the average cost of low-skill-tasks. If this happens symmetrically
in two industries with di⁄ering average skill-intensities, a reduction of the average cost
of low-skill type labor bene￿ts the less skill-intensive industry to a greater extent than
the more skill-intensive one. If a full employment equilibrium requires both industries
to remain viable, then the only way to restore a zero-pro￿t equilibrium is a rise in the
domestic wage rate for low-skilled labor, which restores the initial average cost of low-
skill-type tasks. All of the bene￿t from cheaper o⁄shoring thus accrues to low-skilled
labor, even though o⁄shoring a⁄ects tasks for low-skilled labor.
In my case, this type of reasoning is not possible, since unbundling always a⁄ects sub-
bundles of both types of labor. But the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg result can be framed
in terms of my proposition 1. The cost-savings e⁄ect from cheaper foreign low-skilled
tasks can equivalently be thought of as an increase in the implicit value of what domestic
labor contributes to production value in each of the two industries. If the technology of
o⁄shoring is the same for both industries, as assumed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg,
then the percentage increase in this implicit value is larger for the industry with the larger
ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled workers. In a two-goods-economy, this is like a relative
price increase for the less skill-intensive good. Their result then follows from the usual
Stolper-Samuelson logic. However, it no longer follows directly, if there are more than two
goods. It only follows, if full employment of outputs requires these same two goods to be
produced both before and after the change considered. Whether this is the case depends
on endowments and factor intensities. And this is why my proposition invokes the full
employment conditions through the de￿nitions of weak comparative advantage industries
and industries close to the margin, respectively.28 The next proposition turns to welfare.
Proposition 2 (a) Under incomplete relative wage convergence, unbundling holds an
unambiguous aggregate welfare increase, de￿ned as the possibility to achieve a Pareto
28See also the related propositions derived in Kohler (2003). The logic is also present in Jones
(2000,2005).
26improvement via costless lump-sum compensation.
(b) If unbundling takes place in both types of industries, those close to the margin of local
comparative advantage as well as those distant from that margin, then unbundling leads to
a Pareto-improvement without any compensation requirement, provided the productivity
e⁄ect (implicit price increase) for the industries a⁄ected are not too disproportionate.
This statement is, admittedly, somewhat vague, since it does not specify exactly what
is meant by ￿not too disproportionate￿ . But the proposition nevertheless conveys an
interesting and useful general message. Distributional con￿ icts will typically arise, if
unbundling a⁄ects activities that are concentrated on one side of the cone of diversi￿cation,
whereby the line of division is de￿ned by the endowment ratio. In their seminal papers on
outsourcing, Feenstra & Hanson (1996,1997) note the potential for a Pareto improvement
of outsourcing low-skill-intensive intermediates. In view of the present analysis, it is crucial
that the Feenstra-Hanson-model has only one ￿nal goods producing industry. Proposition
2 allows for many sectors, and the case considered in part (b) in some sense mimics a
single sector economy. The proof again follows from ￿gure 2. Part a) is seen from the fact
that the intersection point between the Hicksian convex hull and the factor endowment
ray Eh=El moves closer to the origin. With incomplete convergence, unbundling must lead
to ￿south-west￿arrows of the sort depicted in ￿gure 2, located somewhere on the initial
hull. So the new hull unambiguously covers new ground further towards the origin, hence
the shift in the intersection point on the endowment line. Indeed, the welfare increase
may be measured, in terms of labor units, as the distance between points V and ~ V . One
could also construct the usual Hicksian variation measures. Part (b) follows from the fact
that a Pareto-improvement without compensation requirement would only obtain, if the
factor price line shifts in such a way that both intersection points with the axes move
closer to the origin. Obviously, this requires that the productivity e⁄ects as derived in
(20) are ￿not too disproportionate￿ .
4 Minimum Wages
The above analysis assumes that unbundling takes place in an ideal environment free of
any distortion, policy-induced or otherwise. The real world is less perfect. For instance,
the German policy debate about the bazaar-e⁄ect revolves around labor market rigidities,
27particularly around the de facto minimum wage rate generated by social security. In this
paper, I do not attempt a full-￿ edged treatment of unbundling under a minimum wage
rate. I would also agree that the model of the previous section is not particularly well
disposed to analyze the unemployment e⁄ects of a minimum wage rate, the reason being
that it tends to generate extreme specialization e⁄ects, if one retains the assumptions of
given world market prices for ￿nal goods and Leontief-technologies in all sectors.29 For
the present purpose, I just accept this type of ￿hypersensitivity￿(Deardor⁄, 2006) and
try do distill a few points from the analysis that I think are interesting and worth making.
Assume, then, that there is a minimum wage for low-skilled labor in the West, wl ￿
wmin
l ; and that it is binding in the initial equilibrium with bundled comparative advantage.
The amount of unemployment can be found by rotating the factor price line with a
￿xed intersection point wmin
l on the horizontal axis, such that it becomes tangent to
the convex hull of unit-value isoquants. Except for an unlikely coincidence tangency
will arise at a kink of the convex hull which gives the skill-intensity of the industry
(industries) that are viable in the West, given world market prices and the minimum
wage rate. Denoting this skill-intensity by ￿, employment of low-skilled labor is equal
to Eh=￿; and the rate of unemployment of low-skilled labor is equal to 1 ￿ (Eh=El)/￿.
This equates the high-skilled and low-skilled labor endowment with the number of people
with respective skills, assuming an exogenous unitary labor supply per person. A binding
minimum wage implies that ￿ > Eh=El. Normalizing the overall population to 1, the
overall rate of unemployment is equal to (￿ ￿ Eh=El)/￿. Figure 3 depicts a case with 6
kinks corresponding to 6 ￿nal goods, the convex hull running from U to Z.
In ￿gure 3, the implicit zero-pro￿t fragments of the two component bundles that lie
behind the aggregate skill-intensity ￿ are given by points A0 and B0. This is in perfect
analogy to ￿gure 1 above. I now assume, arbitrarily, that unbundling of comparative
advantage ￿frees up￿the less skill-intensive, but more productive fragment B: This cor-
responds to the case with reinforcing Ricardian advantage of ￿gure 2. The productivity
e⁄ect is depicted by the arrow between points B0 and ~ B0, and the convex hull now emerges
as UV Z. With ￿ exible wages, we would observe a reduction in the wage for high-skilled
29Egger & Kreickemeier (2005) discuss outsourcing in a model where unemployment arises from a fair
wage restriction.
28labor and a rise in the wage for low-skilled labor, in line with proposition 1 (a) above.30
Also, proposition 2 would imply that such a pattern of unbundling is no Pareto improve-
ment. With the minimum wage rate, we observe a reduction of unemployment, in line
with the skill-intensity of fragment B; denoted by ~ ￿B; coupled with a rise in the wage rate
for high-skilled labor, from wh to ~ wh as depicted. This is a clear Pareto improvement. A
second point worth stressing at this stage is that the magnitude of the productivity e⁄ect
from unbundling is irrelevant for the employment e⁄ect, which is determined solely by
the skill-intensity ~ ￿B. Variations in the magnitude of the productivity e⁄ect are entirely
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30In that proposition the endowment ratio would now need to be replaced by the employed endowment
ratio.
29The crucial condition behind the results identi￿ed in the preceding paragraph is that
￿ > ~ ￿B > Eh=El, whereby ￿ is determined by the minimum wage rate, in connection
with the country￿ s technology and given world prices. If we view the high-skilled wage
e⁄ect as a function of ~ ￿B, other things equal (such as the magnitude of the productivity
e⁄ect, measured by the length of the arrow from B￿to ~ B0), then the skilled wage increase
becomes ever larger as ~ ￿B becomes smaller, as long as ~ ￿B remains in the aforementioned
interval. However, once ~ ￿B reaches Eh=El, the minimum wage rate is no longer binding,
and at this stage there is a discontinuity in the wage adjustment. For ~ ￿B values below
Eh=El, the logic of proposition 1 (a) above applies in full force and skilled labor loses,
however tiny the productivity e⁄ect. No such discontinuity arises if unbundling leaves
fragment A viable. Again the unemployment e⁄ect is determined from the corresponding
skill-intensity ~ ￿A alone, as indicated in ￿gure 3. And skilled labor unambiguously gains,
whatever the value of ~ ￿A: The wage e⁄ect for skilled labor, though positive for all values
of ~ ￿A (whereby ~ ￿A > ￿ by de￿nition of fragment A), is falling in ~ ￿A. The intuition
for this is that, with a binding minimum low-skill wage rate wmin
l , a given productivity
e⁄ect on fragment A from o⁄shore procurement of fragment B mandates a wage increase
which is the higher, the lower aiAh. From ￿iA = aiAhwh + aiAlwl, setting wl = wmin
l ; we
have dwh = (1=aiAh)d￿iA; where d￿iA represents the implicit price increase for fragment
A. Along the factor price line for the bundled comparative advantage equilibrium, aiAh
increases as ~ ￿A becomes larger. This same logic also explains why in the earlier scenario
the wage e⁄ect for high-skilled labor increases, other things equal, as ~ ￿B falls from ￿ down
to Eh=El. We may summarize all of this in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the initial equilibrium with bundled comparative advantage features a
binding minimum wage for low-skilled labor in the West, with unemployment of low-skilled
labor equal to [1 ￿ (Eh=El)/￿]El, then unbundling of comparative advantage has the fol-
lowing e⁄ects on unemployment and the wage for high-skilled labor:
(a) If unbundling leaves viable fragments with a skill-intensity ~ ￿ lower than ￿ but higher
than Eh=El; then unemployment falls and the wage of high-skilled labor rises. The unem-
ployment e⁄ect is determined solely by ~ ￿; while the wage e⁄ect is determined only by the
productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring.
(b) If unbundling leaves viable fragments with a skill-intensity ~ ￿ lower than Eh=El; then
the minimum wage rate is no longer binding, unemployment disappears, and high-skilled
labor loses. At the point ~ ￿ = Eh=El the wage e⁄ect for high-skilled labor jumps from
30positive to negative (discontinuity).
(c) If unbundling leaves viable fragments with a skill-intensity ~ ￿ > ￿, then unemployment
rises, with an attendant rise in the wage for skilled labor. The unemployment e⁄ect is
determined by ~ ￿ alone. The wage e⁄ect depends on the productivity from o⁄shoring, and
￿other things equal ￿it is falling in ~ ￿.
5 Unbundling and Trade Policy
Unbundling of comparative advantage may obviously lead to bazaar e⁄ects. The German
debate revolving around the bazaar-e⁄ect sometimes seems to take it for granted that
an industry experiencing a bazaar-e⁄ect also undergoes a contraction. Bazaar-e⁄ects are
seen as early signs of a loss of international competitiveness and a long-run decline of the
industries a⁄ected. This must be questioned on two accounts.
First, on a fundamental level, unbundling questions the very notion of countries host-
ing entire industries. In a broader context, conditions like (13) and (14) dictate cost-
minimizing supply chains, potentially spanning a large set of locations or countries, and
unbundling renders the notion of entire industries that are located in single countries
outdated. The analysis in this paper suggests that the appropriate view of an industry
is that of a cost-minimizing supply chain. But what, then, does it mean for a country to
own or host such a supply chain? This is an interesting and important question, but I do
not pursue it any further in this paper. There are also far reaching implications for the
appropriate approach that countries should pursue towards drawing up useful and infor-
mative foreign trade statistics. Indeed, a large part of existing statistics may have lost,
and probably will further lose, their usefulness due to the type of unbundling portrayed
in this paper, at least as long as trade is recorded on the basis of output value, not value
added.31
Perhaps more worryingly, unbundling may already have rendered industrial or com-
modity classi￿cations that have shaped existing trade policy obsolete. Yet, the tari⁄
schedules based on these classi￿cations remain in place while unbundling unfolds. This
has two important consequences. First, unbundling aggravates the ￿spaghetti bowl￿syn-
31See the study commissioned by the US National Research Council (2006).
31drome of regional trading arrangements, ￿rst pointed out by Bhagwati et al. (1998). Such
arrangements usually involve rules of origin which are, in turn, based on some form of
content rule. But with potentially complex supply chains, implementing such rules be-
comes very expensive, and they are liable to become instruments of costly protection.
Even without such abuse, existing rules may become forceful barriers for e¢ cient supply
chains that would otherwise emerge from unbundling of comparative advantage. As a
result, the cost of protection, relative to free trade, is likely to increase.
The second implication is more general in that it does not relate to preferential trad-
ing arrangements. Suppose there are pre-existing tari⁄s on several goods. The theory
of e⁄ective protection suggests that unbundling of comparative advantage changes their
protective e⁄ect. The attendant reallocation e⁄ects are notoriously di¢ cult to predict, if
there are many sectors that are a⁄ected. But the above analysis reveals that the direct
reallocation e⁄ect need not be in line with the intuition that industries with bazaar-e⁄ects
are likely to also contract in terms of employment. This is almost trivial for the general
case were there are more activities than factors, where production is indeterminate. I
therefore look at a case where the structure of production is uniquely determined.
Suppose there are only two industries, say industries 0 and 2 in ￿gure 2 above. Given
the unit-value isoquants and equilibrium factor prices, the usual Rybczynski-type diagram
tells us the equilibrium allocation of high-skilled and low-skilled labor among the two
industries. If o⁄shoring is restricted to industry 2, as assumed above, then there will
be reallocation of both types of labor from industry 0 into industry 2, provided that
unbundling makes industry 2 more skill-intensive, i.e. if the more skill-intensive fragment
A remains viable. This can only be an equilibrium if fragment A0s skill-intensity is lower
than Eh=El; but for the present purpose we may assume this to be the case. The bazaar-
e⁄ect is thus coupled with an expansion, not a contraction of the industry. The opposite
holds for a reverse unbundling pattern.
Reallocation e⁄ects of this sort may be important in their own right, but they gain
added importance, if there are pre-existing trade distortions, like import tari⁄s or export
subsidies. It is well known that aggregate welfare of a country increases if imports of a
good which is subject to a tari⁄ increase. Any exogenous change that leads to such an
32increase has a positive ￿rst-order aggregate welfare e⁄ect.32 In the simple case discussed
in the preceding paragraph, if good 2 is imported and if there is an import tari⁄, then the
bazaar-e⁄ect involves a negative ￿rst-order welfare e⁄ect on account of the pre-existing
distortion. The reason is that it enhances domestic output of industry 2. Under plausible
conditions, this lowers imports of good 2, which are suboptimally low to start with (due to
the import tari⁄). This undermines the positive welfare e⁄ect from o⁄shoring identi￿ed
in proposition 2 above. If good 2 is an export good, then the same pattern of unbundling
involves a positive ￿rst-order welfare e⁄ect. Thus, if exports of a certain industry increase
although bazaar-type phenomena reduce its domestic production depth, this may well be
bene￿cial. All of these conclusions are, of course, reversed if the pattern of unbundling
leads to a reverse reallocation pattern (expansion of industry 0). To the best of my
knowledge, such ￿rst-order welfare e⁄ects of o⁄shoring that follow from pre-existing tari⁄s
have so far not been noticed in the o⁄shoring literature. In my view they merit further
attention.
6 O⁄shoring versus Migration
Although the cost of migration has fallen over the past two decades, the reduction in the
costs of o⁄shoring has no doubt been even larger. Better ￿glues￿have been developed for
￿gluing￿productive services generated abroad into domestic value added chains. Political
apprehension is observed with respect to both, o⁄shoring and migration, perhaps resting
on the belief that they have similar e⁄ects on wages and employment opportunities for do-
mestic workers in countries where o⁄shoring takes place, and in countries receiving inward
labor migration, respectively. This seems most likely for the type of ￿high-resolution-
o⁄shoring￿analyzed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b), where low-skilled labor is
￿glued￿directly into domestic production. Indeed, this type of o⁄shoring might even in-
volve some ￿migration￿in the form of domestic high-skilled labor moving abroad in order
to combine with foreign low-skilled labor, say in line with the requirement of a certain
inputs sub-bundle in the sense described above.
32See, for instance, Anderson & Neary (2005, ch. 3) for a general treatment. It is relatively obvious
that the reasoning applies not just to reallocation of resources used for ￿nal goods, but also for input-
sub-bundles of the type analyzed above.
33But this would not constitute migration in the usual sense of the word, because high-
skilled labor would not enter the foreign pool of high-skilled labor, earning the ongoing
foreign wage w￿
h. Instead, it would perform speci￿c tasks related to a productive service
for a certain domestic industry, and earning the domestic wage rate wh although working
abroad. Alternatively, such trade in tasks might also take place through ￿onshoring￿
foreign labor, but paying it the foreign wage rate, gross of any cost of movement born by
the worker.33 In some models of o⁄shoring where this cost is convex in the amount of
foreign labor used, as in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b), the equilibrium wage paid
to foreign low-skilled labor is equal to the domestic wage rate, adjusted for the cost of
o⁄shoring (or ￿onshoring￿ , for that matter) at the margin. If the cost of o⁄shoring is the
same as the cost of migrating, and if one assumes the same condition to govern o⁄shoring
in all industries, then immigration and o⁄shoring lead to the same amount of low-skilled
foreign labor used in domestic production.
But, as noted by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2006b), the gains involved in migration
and o⁄shoring, respectively, accrue to di⁄erent people. The easiest case to look at is one
where both economies exhibit factor price insensitivity. Technically, this implies that the
factor endowment ray intersects the convex hull of unit-value isoquants in the interior of
one of its linear segments. If low-skilled labor in the East has a marginal value produc-
tivity equal to w￿
l < wl, then labor reallocation from East to West obviously generates an
e¢ ciency gain. But who will reap this gain? With o⁄shoring, convex o⁄shoring costs lead
to a downward-sloping demand by Western ￿rms for Eastern low-skilled labor, meeting a
￿ at Eastern supply. With migration, costs of migration lead to an upward-sloping supply
of Eastern low-skilled migrants meeting ￿ at Western demand for low-skilled labor. Obvi-
ously, the incidence of bene￿ts will be di⁄erent. With o⁄shoring, gains accrue to Western
￿rms and, ultimately, their workers. With migration, these same gains are enjoyed by
Eastern migrants.
There is a further key di⁄erence between migration and o⁄shoring. With migration,
33This form of globalization bears a close resemblance to certain modes of trade in services under
the GATS; see Bhagwati et al. (2005). It is also highly relevant against the backdrop of the heated
debate about the Directive on Services in the Internal Market of the EU. The original intention was to
implement the origin principle, according to which labor services could be provided ￿onshore￿in country
A by workers from country B; under laws and regulation existing in country B.
34foreign labor enters the entire domestic pool of labor, say of the low-skill type. With
o⁄shoring, labor enters the domestic economy in a much more selective way, since it will
not normally be feasible equally well across all industries. If industries di⁄er in their
skill-intensity, this matters a lot for the wage e⁄ect, as we have seen above. There will be
potentially severe wage e⁄ects from o⁄shoring even in situations where the economy as
a whole would exhibit factor price insensitivity to immigration. To see this, take ￿gure
1 above and change shift the endowment point to the right while leaving the unit-value
isoquants, and thus the convex hull, unchanged. There is no wage e⁄ect, at least for a
moderate change. By way of contrast, any pattern of o⁄shoring will change the convex
hull, as we have seen in detail above.
The truly fundamental di⁄erence between the two forms of globalization, however,
is that o⁄shoring allows the domestic economy to resort to foreign supply of labor at
foreign conditions (wages), while migration allows foreign workers to enter domestic value
added chains at domestic conditions (wages). This is reminiscent of Ramaswami￿ s (1968)
result on the optimal policy for factor ￿ ows, which was much discussed in the 1980s,
particularly with respect to migration (see Bhagwati & Srinivasan, 1983), but has since
fallen into oblivion. A key ingredient of the optimal policy identi￿ed by Ramaswami is to
employ foreign labor (as migrants) in domestic production at a (net-of-tax) wage which is
equal to the foreign rate, and which is therefore lower than the wage for native labor with
the same production characteristics. This type of discrimination was, and still is, widely
regarded as unacceptable. But it is evident from the above that o⁄shoring involves just
this type of discriminatory use of foreign labor, except that in the context of o⁄shoring
the foreign labor employed is not migrants, but workers employed in their home country.
Thus, the issue of discrimination simply does not arise, at least not in a directly obvious
way.34
Are we to conclude, then, that o⁄shoring is a deplorable attempt to achieve what in re-
action to the Ramaswami theorem was widely considered unacceptable ￿a ￿Ramaswami-
type policy￿in disguise? In my view, this conclusion would be wrongheaded. If interna-
tional earnings discrepancies are any indication of di⁄ering marginal value productivities
of labor, then international reallocation of labor holds enormous e¢ ciency gains for the
34See the discussion in Jones (2005).
35world economy. Aiming for a reallocation where most of these gains end up in rich
countries￿pockets would certainly be deplorable. But o⁄shoring does not do this in a
systematic way. True, labor migration would probably be the straightest way to reduce
international inequality. It may, however, be coupled with unwelcome redistribution in
receiving countries. For this and other reasons, labor migration faces severe political ob-
stacles in potential receiving countries. Restrictions on immigration are widely regarded
as an accepted exercise of national sovereignty towards protection of native workers. As
Freeman (2006) notes, one way forward would be to ￿redistribute the bene￿ts of immigra-
tion so that a greater share of the bene￿ts ￿ow to natives and a lower share to the bene￿ts
to immigrants￿ . Given the aforementioned di⁄erence regarding the incidence of e¢ ciency
gains from o⁄shoring and migration, respectively, o⁄shoring might be a useful element in
a general strategy to achieve e¢ ciency gains from reallocation of labor through forms of
globalization that are politically feasible.
The usefulness of o⁄shoring for such a strategy derives from the foreign factor price
e⁄ects that have been shut o⁄, for simplicity only, in my previous argument. One way
to think of this issue is to see a trade-o⁄ between the e¢ ciency gain achieved through
reallocating the world￿ s labor from low to high marginal productivity uses on the one
hand, and unwelcome labor market consequences (wages, employment) in high income
countries. Political preferences, mainly in advanced countries, determine a politically
optimal position on this trade-o⁄. The above analysis suggests that this trade-o⁄ may
be quite di⁄erent in a case where e¢ ciency gains are obtained through migration from
low income to high income countries from a case where such gains are sought through
o⁄shoring bits and pieces of high income countries￿ s production to low wage countries.
Moreover, the analysis suggests that, all discomposure about o⁄shoring notwithstanding,
the political equilibrium allows for a larger e¢ ciency gain to be achieved via o⁄shoring
than via migration.35 The snag is that with o⁄shoring a larger share of the gain is likely
to end up in high income countries. But even so, low income countries may still be better
o⁄this way than with the much lower overall e¢ ciency gain that is feasible via migration
alone.
35A further point to be taken into account here is the apparent low responsiveness of international
migration with respect to international income and wage di⁄erences.
367 Summary and Conclusion
From a narrow perspective of a single industry, o⁄shoring may sometimes look like losing
certain stages of production that have traditionally been viewed as pivotal to the industry￿ s
international competitiveness. If this happens in several industries, one may be tempted to
see the specter of de-industrialization, or a move from an industrial stronghold to a bazaar
economy. In this paper, I have suggested a somewhat broader interpretation of events.
Bazaar-e⁄ects may re￿ ect grand-scale unbundling of comparative advantage, leading to
a whole new pattern of specialization that negates traditional views according to which
countries host whole industries. If viewed in this way, certain bazaar-type phenomena are
far less worrying than some of the rhetoric used in recent debates might suggest.
I have described this type of unbundling by using a stylized model that features Ri-
cardian plus Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms of comparative advantage. For many goods,
modern industrial production must be seen as involving several fragments, or sub-bundles
of inputs. A country￿ s comparative advantage may be particularly strong for some sub-
bundles, while for others it may actually have a comparative disadvantage. If the process
cannot be unbundled, only average advantage matters. If advances in technology and
institutions allow for unbundling of such fragments across borders, then the international
structure of production may undergo far-reaching changes.
Within each economy, this change has two important dimensions that determine how
it a⁄ects individual workers and the overall well-being of the economy. First it involves
a whole new pattern of domestic demand for di⁄erent types of labor (or more generally
di⁄erent types of factors). And secondly, it allows countries to reap productivity gains
by ￿freeing up￿ certain fragments of production chains from being bundled with less
e¢ cient ones. The net e⁄ect of both types of changes on earnings and employment
perspectives of di⁄erent types of workers depends on the detailed pattern of unbundling.
As a general statement, this is no surprise. What I have done in this paper is to describe
the characteristics of such unbundling that are relevant for whether it is low-skilled or
high-skilled labor that stands to gain or lose in terms of real wage income.
An important message from the analysis is that some of the intuition that one ￿nds
invoked in the public debate as well as in the empirical literature, while probably correct
for the short run, is wrongheaded in the long run. In particular, o⁄shoring of input-
sub-bundles that intensively use low-skilled labor may well bene￿t domestic low-skilled
37workers. Indeed unbundling may even be Pareto-improving. While such possibilities have
been recognized in the past, the challenge was to identify in a useful way the general
mechanism that drives such counter-intuitive possibilities.
The results presented here leave much room for further work. I see at least two po-
tentially fruitful avenues. First, empirical work that tries to identify the direction and
magnitude of wage e⁄ects from o⁄shoring should explicitly di⁄erentiate between short-
run and long-run e⁄ects. And in doing so, it should allow for non-monotonic adjustment.
My results do not, of course, go as far as suggesting how such a dynamic speci￿cation
should look like, but the potential for non-monotonicity is there. And my results should
go some way at least towards identifying observable variables that need to be taken into
account towards richer dynamic speci￿cations. And secondly, from a theoretical per-
spective, knowing the characteristics of industries and fragments that determine whether
wage e⁄ects from o⁄shoring favor one type of labor over another is only half the story. To
complete the story one needs to explore the relationship between these characteristics on
the one hand and the elements that drive o⁄shoring on the other. These latter elements
have to do with the ￿economics of gluing￿fragments of production that are separated,
not only in space as such, but also across countries and jurisdictions. In other words,
what we need is merging the two strands of literature that I have identi￿ed above, one
focusing (like this paper) on the general equilibrium wage and employment e⁄ects, the
other focusing on costs of communication, transport and contractual imperfections. This
should also generate further insight into whether o⁄shoring is indeed a useful alternative
to migration for reducing worldwide inequality, as I have suggested in this paper.
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